by Dan Linnaeus (@DanLinnaeus)
NOTAMs reveal extensive adjustments to air traffic flow, communication frequencies, and route availability to accommodate operational needs within Iranian airspace.
In response to regional tensions and impending escalations, Iran has issued a series of NOTAMs detailing significant adjustments within its airspace. Multiple airways have been closed, alternative routes established, and temporary unidirectional and bidirectional RNAV5 routes designated, available solely under ATC direction. Additionally, radar and communication frequencies have been updated across multiple sectors, while specific caution and danger areas have been deactivated to streamline commercial airspace management. Heightened control and flexibility, allowing Iran to redirect traffic and manage operational security more dynamically, indicates that Iran is preparing its airspace infrastructure for military operations.
Iran has signaled an impending response to Israel’s October 26 strikes, with Iranian leadership issuing increasingly assertive statements. Yesterday, IRGC Deputy Commander Ali Fadavi confirmed that Iran will not let the Israeli attack go unanswered, emphasizing that every attack on Iran over the past 40 years has been met with retaliation. Fadavi indicated Iran’s capability to strike Israel decisively, suggesting that a single offensive could cripple Israel’s assets, (Al-Mayadeen).
Meanwhile, Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi, IRGC Deputy Coordinator, reinforced this stance by announcing that additional intensified strikes are forthcoming, aiming to leverage strategic surprise to weaken Israeli defenses, (Al-Alam).
Gholamhossein Mohammadi Golpayegani, head of the supreme leader’s office, echoed the IRGC’s bellicose rhetoric on Thursday, stating that Iran planned a “fierce, tooth-breaking response” to Israel’s “desperate action,” (Tasnim New Agency).
Tensions have risen sharply with a recent report from CNN citing an unnamed senior official who disclosed that Iran’s response would likely be “decisive and painful,” potentially before the U.S. presidential election.
Notably, the usual handful of covert track-two diplomacy mouthpieces for Tehran, with various levels of exclusive access to the regime, such as Farnaz Fassihi, who published an article for the New York Times a few hours ago, Trita Parsi, the co-founder of Quincy Institute and founder of the National Iranian-Amercan Council (NIAC), and a smattering of academics such as Georgetown University’s Sina Azodi, have all weighed in to shape public perceptions in D.C. through articles, interviews and quotes.
The consensus narrative is that Tehran is faced with a difficult choice and cannot afford inaction or further delay.
This narrative projects a timeline that diverges from previous assessments, which suggested Iran might delay action to avoid influencing the U.S. political landscape in favor of Trump. Following the attacks Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ordered the Supreme National Security Council to prepare a retaliatory strike on Israel, which killed at least four Iranian-affiliated soldiers. Khamenei’s delay in immediate retaliation has been framed as a deliberate attempt to avoid influencing U.S. elections in favor of Trump by several observers, (New York Times).
In the direct aftermath of Israel’s October 26 strike Iran’s official reactions shared a common message in statements: Tehran reserves the right to a “suitable response” at an “appropriate time,” which was seen as strategic signal of both the limited impact of the attack and Tehran’s calculated approach to restraint due to its own designs for influencing the U.S. elections.
These latest disclosures suggest Iran’s calculus has shifted and is accelerating its plans, recalibrating its response window to maximize strategic impact.
It appears that Iran is aiming to change Israel’s strategic calculations, promising to deliver a response that goes beyond merely answering the recent attack. The objective is to impose greater costs on Israel through a response more significant and severe than previous actions, designed to have a deeper impact on Israeli decision-making processes. Iranian state-linked media noted, “In any military confrontation, the first and last strikes both carry significance. Therefore, in military exchanges that include elements of deterrence, who delivers the final blow influences mutual perceptions and affects international interpretations.“ (Iran Nuances).
In Israel, military and political leadership are preparing for further escalation. Following the October 26 strikes, IDF Chief of Staff LTG Herzi Halevi addressed Israeli forces, warning that any renewed Iranian missile offensive would meet a strong counterattack, indicating that Israel had held back certain capabilities in its initial strike. Recent Israeli media reports reveal that the war cabinet is now weighing a large-scale preemptive strike targeting the IRGC Aerospace Force (IRGC-AF), aiming to disable Iran’s missile capabilities before an attack on Israel can occur. This potential preemptive action reflects Israel’s proactive posture in forestalling IRGC retaliation and maintaining regional security control.
However, the nature of any impending exchange remains unclear. Israeli intelligence sources have identified Iraq as a probable location for Iran’s retaliatory action. Concurrently, despite a lack of visible preparations for missile or drone launches from Iranian territory, U.S. assessments continue to highlight Iran’s recent acceleration in mobilization capability. This aligns with past instances where Iranian actions were detected only hours before execution, (Walla News).
Thirty minutes ago the Pentagon released a readout for Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin III’s call with Israel Minister of Defense, Yoav Galant. The counterparts discussed regional de-escalation, with the Secdef reaffirming the U.S. commitment to defend Israel and regional partners from Iranian threats. The “United States remains fully prepared to defend U.S. personnel, Israel, and partners across the region against threats from Iran and Iran-backed proxy groups,” stated Austin while emphasizing the need to pursue diplomatic arrangements in the region, underlining the ongoing conflict in Lebanon and Gaza, (DoD).
U.S.-Israeli diplomatic coordination has been ongoing, with U.S. officials Amos Hochstein and Brett McGurk consulting Israeli leaders on countermeasures to Iranian threats in Lebanon, Gaza, and Iraq. These discussions have focused on synchronized deterrent strategies and managing proxy threats, underscoring U.S. and Israeli alignment on preemptive and retaliatory protocols to neutralize potential Iranian moves swiftly and collectively.
Tehran’s signaling recalibration of its response timeline, coupled with airspace modifications to facilitate controlled movement and rapid response options, underscores a strategic escalation. Meanwhile, Israel’s consideration of a preemptive strike on IRGC Aerospace Force assets reflects its own anticipation of further confrontation. Diplomatic coordination with the U.S. emphasizes Israel’s and its allies’ commitment to a robust deterrence posture, as each side positions itself for potential escalations that could shift regional dynamics considerably to the backdrop of the U.S. presidential election.
Israel’s dismantling of the IRGC-AF’s ability to replenish its limited supply of IRBMs, combined with the SEAD operations on Oct 26 that degraded Iran’s air defenses, has far-reaching implications.
Given the IRIAF, while a potentially cumbersome nuisance, poses no serious threat to the IAF, Tehran now finds itself in a tactical vice grip, comparable to the first and last vehicles of a mechanized column being destroyed on a narrow pass. The IRGC-AF must carefully weigh how to deploy its remaining offensive missile arsenal. And the stakes could not be higher, as should they lose the exchange and suffer a humiliation they are not immune from the fallout domestically and regionally.
Not only must Iran weigh its existing reserve—estimated at 1,500-3,000 missiles, minus the 300 or so already expended in previous attacks in April and October—but it faces another security dilemma: the IAF’s strategic assets are housed in hardened, subterranean hangars, likely immune to these threats. Conversely, when the IRGC-AF fires missiles, they leave thermal and electromagnetic signatures that GEOINT can parse and convert into target banks, which will only accelerate the depletion of their limited arsenal.
If Iran continues this tit-for-tat “Catch my Ballistics” escalation, it will likely exhaust its offensive missile capabilities within 3-6 more rounds. With Hezbollah’s offensive capacities also significantly degraded, Iran’s critical assets—including their naval forces (IRGC-N), nuclear facilities, strategic interests that are foundational to Iranian influence like drone and shell production facilities as well as key economic sites like their oil facilities—all become increasingly vulnerable.
In sum, the script appears to have been flipped and Tehran is now the not-so-slowly boiling frog.
References
1. Iran Nuances. (2024, October 31). Will Iran respond to Israel’s attack? Retrieved from https://fa.irannuances.com/1403/08/08/
2. Ravid, B. (2024, October 30). Israeli sources: Iran may respond from Iraq. Walla News.
3. Fassihi, F. (2024, October 31). Iranian officials threaten retaliation for Israeli strikes. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/31/world/middleeast/iran-retaliation-israel-strikes.html
4. Stein, A. [@AmichaiStein1]. (2024, October 31). U.S.-Israel diplomatic discussions on regional security. Twitter.
5. Salem, M. (2024, October 30). Israel’s strikes on Iran broke a 40-year taboo. Tehran faces tough choices about what to do next. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/29/middleeast/israels-strikes-on-iran-shattered-a-forty-year-taboo-mime-intl/index.html
6. Al-Mayadeen. (2024, October 30). Ali Fadavi comments on Iranian response certainty.
7. Al-Alam TV. (2024, October 30). IRGC Deputy Coordinator announces continued strikes.
8. Tasnim News Agency (2024, October 31). Golpayegani, head of the supreme leader’s office statements.
9. U.S. Department of Defense. (2024, October 16). Readout of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III’s call with Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant. https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3937582/readout-of-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iiis-call-with-israeli-minister/
10. Federal Aviation Administration. (2024, October 31). NOTAMs for Tehran FIR (OIIX), Mashhad FIR (OIMM), Shiraz FIR (OISS), and Kish FIR (OIKX). Retrieved from https://www.notams.faa.gov/dinsQueryWeb/queryRetrievalMapAction.do?reportType=Raw&retrieveLocId=oiix,oimm,oiss,oikx&actionType=notamRetrievalbyICAOs#OIIX
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